History

Jelena Zubkova

Jelena Zubkova

Professor of History, PhD

The less familiar history is to people, the louder they are in voicing their views about it. History has become a refuge for dilettantes, but that is only one aspect of the problem. It is sad when history and historical memory are used as a tool for political, personal, or monetary gain. Then the discussion on history turns into a battlefield, historical memory into monument conflicts, textbooks into catalogues of accusations and pretexts. In battles over the past, a whole “guard of history warriors” materialises, cashing in on their own efforts.

Doesn’t it sound familiar in the light of Estonian-Russian relations over the past couple of decades? Either side is protecting “their” version of the past and shows little respect (at best) for the “stranger’s” history. Whereas for some reason the fact that History, if taken seriously, needs no protecting at all, seems to be forgotten. History – that is everything that has taken place, good as well as evil. It’s the past we must comprehend and bear in mind. For that, we must know the history. Let’s remember that history begins with questions, getting to know history starts with the skill of asking them. We tend to look for convenient answers from the past – and that’s it. But then, what has it got to do with history?

Estonia makes a special case. The history of this tiny nation has lived in the shadow of big countries’ history for a long time, but the importance of history does not depend on the size of the country. Tiny Estonia has its big history – complex, bright, original. The past of Estonia and Estonians forms a part of world history, several centuries of common history connecting Estonia and Russia. The intersection of their pasts, however, does not mean that the fate of the nations has been similar. Therefore the past is reflected differently in our historical memories. There is a reason why we find it so hard to overcome our complicated past. But every step of the way means moving towards a consensus and away from confrontation.

Besides being useful, researching the “stranger’s” history is fascinating, even essential. Though the phrase “we have learned nothing from history” is met with scepticism, we must admit: history might teach nothing, but it does help us cope today.

70 years after the MRP

Even 70 years after the beginning of World War II, there’s a fight over words among Europe’s policymakers. How to recap the events that started 1 September 1939? Small, graspable figures may be the most striking. Estonia had 11 prime ministers in between the two World Wars; ten of them fell victim to the Soviet terror. The commencement of World War II brought great devastation to Central and Eastern Europe, experienced only to some extent by Western Europeans. (Die Welt, 1.9)

The Baltics have devoted themselves to demonstrating how Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania witnessed the similarities of Hitler’s and Stalin’s regimes and war plans. They successfully brought it into focus at the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, which now wishes to make 23 August a day of remembrance for victims of Nazism and Stalinism. (FAZ, 4.7)

According to Stefan Troebst, historian and professor of Eastern and Central European Cultural Studies, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact meant the loss of only just established sovereignty for the Baltic nations. It was deeply traumatising for the countries, which is still evident today. By signing the Pact, the parties obtained the right to act at their own discretion in their respective spheres of influence. They could occupy, divide or annex another state. As Russia and its neighbours interpret history differently, it taints their relationship. Troebst believes the relations between Russia and the Baltics will not improve unless Moscow changes its attitude. (SZ, 23.8)

The secret appendix to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence.
The secret appendix to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence.
© Peep Pillak

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded in 1939 is not just another event of days gone by; its legacy is visible in Europe today, too. This spring the European Parliament proclaimed 23 August the Remembrance Day for victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. The need for the decision is well emphasised by the fact that the date most likely does not mean anything for the majority of Western Europeans. Some unreasonably criticise the resolution for lessening the uniqueness of Nazi crimes. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, areas cast into the mercy of Moscow by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were annexed to the Soviet empire as if naturally. Thus the Pact was the downbeat of a decades-long period of national suppression for Poland and the Baltics, while the West recognised it rather as a disgraceful episode of a dark period. But since the time those countries regained independence and became a part of a united Europe, the shared memories of the West and the East have turned into politics once again. Europe could express its solidarity by committing the period of communist repressions to the European cultural memory. (Die Welt, 23.8)

Russia’s unwillingness to honestly consider the role of the Soviet Union in starting World War II and in the crimes related to the war is reflected in Russia’s “strengthening spheres of influence” mind-set. That is why debates about history do not just touch upon the past, as the question is about the common future of Europe. Could the fact that the Germans have admitted their guilt in World War II mean that Russia’s attitude towards its history will change, if only it is given more time? Russia has changed its reaction to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, from denying it to justifying it. Maybe a little surprisingly, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the pact “immoral”, but at the same time he equated it with the Munich Agreement of a year earlier. Despite Putin’s surprising leniency, Russia is very far from settling accounts with the imperialist Soviet past. The country has not acknowledged the occupation of the Baltic states nor Stalin’s crimes against humanity. Many Western and Russian commentators believe that by justifying Stalin’s actions, Russia is trying to justify its current policy based on its sphere of influence, which many of Russia’s neighbours have already experienced. Like Germany, until Russia settles its accounts with the dark chapters of history, nobody can deal with Russia as with an ordinary democracy, even if one day it were to become one. (Aamulehti, 13.9)

Heiki Lindpere presents the book
Heiki Lindpere presents the book "MRP - Difficult Confession" 21.8.2009.
© DelfiPressifoto

As European democracies celebrate the 20th anniversary of their liberation from communism and the Soviets, Moscow seeks to restore its dominance over former satellites. Rewriting Russian history is part of this plan. Russia has recently intensified its revisionist campaign, claiming that it voluntarily gave up communism and that the Cold War ended in a draw with the West. Moscow maintains that the USSR never occupied its neighbouring states, but liberated them from tyranny. Unlike Germany, Russia has never paid reparations for Soviet crimes and expropriations in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead of admitting its role, Russia depicts itself as a victim and a victor. Moscow took another step to revise its history by forming a commission to identify anti-Russian propaganda. This is in particular a response to steps by neighbouring governments in Estonia, Poland and Ukraine, who talk openly about Soviet repression. (WSJ, 11.6)

International Committee of the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory gathers for the first time. From the left: Toomas Hiio, Pavel Žacek, Paavo Keisalo, president Ilves, Lasse Lehtinen, Kristian Gerner, Nicholas Lane. 8.12.2009.
International Committee of the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory gathers for the first time. From the left: Toomas Hiio, Pavel Žacek, Paavo Keisalo, president Ilves, Lasse Lehtinen, Kristian Gerner, Nicholas Lane. 8.12.2009.
© Toomas Volmer

20 years after the Baltic Chain

The Baltic states achieved independence from the Soviet Union by singing. Singing banned songs was a political demonstration and a sign of unity. The resistance, which lasted for years, was finally successful. Folk songs have a special meaning in the Baltic states. For a long time the public performance of native traditions was not allowed in the Baltic states, and that is why people gathered secretly. In the 1980s, during the time of perestroika, a fresh breeze blew through the Baltic states. In August 1988 nationalist songs were sung in Tartu. A year later the Baltic nations expressed their unity in an impressive way, as on 23 August 1989 more than a million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians formed the Baltic Chain. It was 620 kilometres long and reached from Vilnius through Riga to Tallinn. Shortly after this event the Baltic states proclaimed their independence. (Deutsche Welle, 23.8)

The longest human chain ever united Tallinn and Vilnius in August 1989. It marked the peak moment of the Baltic states’ independence movement. It took a lot of planning, as the 620-kilometre course could not have a single empty spot. Everything worked out. Holding hands, people formed a chain through the three countries. This was a peaceful demonstration to achieve independence, a wake-up call to the Western world which had to reach Moscow. In record time the Baltic states managed to rebuild their countries. (Handelsblatt, 5.8)

Opening of the Baltic Chain Run 22.8.2009.
Opening of the Baltic Chain Run 22.8.2009.
© DelfiPressifoto

Seventy years since the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, 20 years since the Baltic Chain. These anniversaries remind us that we have to hold on fast to the idea of a common and free Europe. It is always easy to forget that this major move towards something better only took place in Europe in the last few decades. That is what the nearly two million people dreamed about, holding hands in the chain that ran through the three Baltic states. Now, 20 years later, we live in this future that people then dreamed of. Modern Europe is more stable, wealthier, more open and safer than it was for most of the 20th century. Everyday life in Europe may seem dull, but some time ago this would have seemed a utopia. We have to hold on to this achievement. (Kaleva, 22.8)

Just like the Berlin Wall, the Baltic Chain had a strong symbolic meaning; its influence reached further than the geographical kilometres it covered. The chain that ran through the three countries marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet era in the Soviet Union. In February 1989 Georgian demonstrators gathered on the streets of Tbilisi. Then, 20 people lost their lives at the hands of Soviet soldiers. Six months later, when two million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians peacefully defied the authorities by sending an unprecedented signal to the world via the Baltic Chain, the army did not try to use force to stop it. Of course, Moscow condemned the huge demonstration and over the next two years Latvian and Lithuanian citizens lost their lives in the demonstrations of power by the authorities. But by that time the irreversible steps had been taken and the Baltic states were on their way towards independence. In August 1989 the Baltic nations began to tear down the Iron Curtain; in November the Germans did the same. The Baltic Chain was like a huge arrow that struck the heart of the Berlin Wall. The importance of this historic event has also been acknowledged by UNESCO, which entered the Baltic Chain in its Memory of the World register. (Le Figaro, 24.8)

President wrote on the duplicate of the Berlin Wall: ''Elagu vaba Eesti!'' (Long live free Estonia!) 22.8.2009.
President wrote on the duplicate of the Berlin Wall: ''Elagu vaba Eesti!'' (Long live free Estonia!) 22.8.2009.
© DelfiPressifoto
ajaloo pildid

Jelena Zubkova

Jelena Zubkova

Professor of History, PhD

The less familiar history is to people, the louder they are in voicing their views about it. History has become a refuge for dilettantes, but that is only one aspect of the problem. It is sad when history and historical memory are used as a tool for political, personal, or monetary gain. Then the discussion on history turns into a battlefield, historical memory into monument conflicts, textbooks into catalogues of accusations and pretexts. In battles over the past, a whole “guard of history warriors” materialises, cashing in on their own efforts.

Doesn’t it sound familiar in the light of Estonian-Russian relations over the past couple of decades? Either side is protecting “their” version of the past and shows little respect (at best) for the “stranger’s” history. Whereas for some reason the fact that History, if taken seriously, needs no protecting at all, seems to be forgotten. History – that is everything that has taken place, good as well as evil. It’s the past we must comprehend and bear in mind. For that, we must know the history. Let’s remember that history begins with questions, getting to know history starts with the skill of asking them. We tend to look for convenient answers from the past – and that’s it. But then, what has it got to do with history?

Estonia makes a special case. The history of this tiny nation has lived in the shadow of big countries’ history for a long time, but the importance of history does not depend on the size of the country. Tiny Estonia has its big history – complex, bright, original. The past of Estonia and Estonians forms a part of world history, several centuries of common history connecting Estonia and Russia. The intersection of their pasts, however, does not mean that the fate of the nations has been similar. Therefore the past is reflected differently in our historical memories. There is a reason why we find it so hard to overcome our complicated past. But every step of the way means moving towards a consensus and away from confrontation.

Besides being useful, researching the “stranger’s” history is fascinating, even essential. Though the phrase “we have learned nothing from history” is met with scepticism, we must admit: history might teach nothing, but it does help us cope today.

70 years after the MRP

Even 70 years after the beginning of World War II, there’s a fight over words among Europe’s policymakers. How to recap the events that started 1 September 1939? Small, graspable figures may be the most striking. Estonia had 11 prime ministers in between the two World Wars; ten of them fell victim to the Soviet terror. The commencement of World War II brought great devastation to Central and Eastern Europe, experienced only to some extent by Western Europeans. (Die Welt, 1.9)

The Baltics have devoted themselves to demonstrating how Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania witnessed the similarities of Hitler’s and Stalin’s regimes and war plans. They successfully brought it into focus at the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, which now wishes to make 23 August a day of remembrance for victims of Nazism and Stalinism. (FAZ, 4.7)

According to Stefan Troebst, historian and professor of Eastern and Central European Cultural Studies, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact meant the loss of only just established sovereignty for the Baltic nations. It was deeply traumatising for the countries, which is still evident today. By signing the Pact, the parties obtained the right to act at their own discretion in their respective spheres of influence. They could occupy, divide or annex another state. As Russia and its neighbours interpret history differently, it taints their relationship. Troebst believes the relations between Russia and the Baltics will not improve unless Moscow changes its attitude. (SZ, 23.8)

The secret appendix to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence.
The secret appendix to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence.
© Peep Pillak

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded in 1939 is not just another event of days gone by; its legacy is visible in Europe today, too. This spring the European Parliament proclaimed 23 August the Remembrance Day for victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. The need for the decision is well emphasised by the fact that the date most likely does not mean anything for the majority of Western Europeans. Some unreasonably criticise the resolution for lessening the uniqueness of Nazi crimes. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, areas cast into the mercy of Moscow by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were annexed to the Soviet empire as if naturally. Thus the Pact was the downbeat of a decades-long period of national suppression for Poland and the Baltics, while the West recognised it rather as a disgraceful episode of a dark period. But since the time those countries regained independence and became a part of a united Europe, the shared memories of the West and the East have turned into politics once again. Europe could express its solidarity by committing the period of communist repressions to the European cultural memory. (Die Welt, 23.8)

Russia’s unwillingness to honestly consider the role of the Soviet Union in starting World War II and in the crimes related to the war is reflected in Russia’s “strengthening spheres of influence” mind-set. That is why debates about history do not just touch upon the past, as the question is about the common future of Europe. Could the fact that the Germans have admitted their guilt in World War II mean that Russia’s attitude towards its history will change, if only it is given more time? Russia has changed its reaction to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, from denying it to justifying it. Maybe a little surprisingly, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the pact “immoral”, but at the same time he equated it with the Munich Agreement of a year earlier. Despite Putin’s surprising leniency, Russia is very far from settling accounts with the imperialist Soviet past. The country has not acknowledged the occupation of the Baltic states nor Stalin’s crimes against humanity. Many Western and Russian commentators believe that by justifying Stalin’s actions, Russia is trying to justify its current policy based on its sphere of influence, which many of Russia’s neighbours have already experienced. Like Germany, until Russia settles its accounts with the dark chapters of history, nobody can deal with Russia as with an ordinary democracy, even if one day it were to become one. (Aamulehti, 13.9)

Heiki Lindpere presents the book
Heiki Lindpere presents the book "MRP - Difficult Confession" 21.8.2009.
© DelfiPressifoto

As European democracies celebrate the 20th anniversary of their liberation from communism and the Soviets, Moscow seeks to restore its dominance over former satellites. Rewriting Russian history is part of this plan. Russia has recently intensified its revisionist campaign, claiming that it voluntarily gave up communism and that the Cold War ended in a draw with the West. Moscow maintains that the USSR never occupied its neighbouring states, but liberated them from tyranny. Unlike Germany, Russia has never paid reparations for Soviet crimes and expropriations in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead of admitting its role, Russia depicts itself as a victim and a victor. Moscow took another step to revise its history by forming a commission to identify anti-Russian propaganda. This is in particular a response to steps by neighbouring governments in Estonia, Poland and Ukraine, who talk openly about Soviet repression. (WSJ, 11.6)

International Committee of the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory gathers for the first time. From the left: Toomas Hiio, Pavel Žacek, Paavo Keisalo, president Ilves, Lasse Lehtinen, Kristian Gerner, Nicholas Lane. 8.12.2009.
International Committee of the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory gathers for the first time. From the left: Toomas Hiio, Pavel Žacek, Paavo Keisalo, president Ilves, Lasse Lehtinen, Kristian Gerner, Nicholas Lane. 8.12.2009.
© Toomas Volmer

20 years after the Baltic Chain

The Baltic states achieved independence from the Soviet Union by singing. Singing banned songs was a political demonstration and a sign of unity. The resistance, which lasted for years, was finally successful. Folk songs have a special meaning in the Baltic states. For a long time the public performance of native traditions was not allowed in the Baltic states, and that is why people gathered secretly. In the 1980s, during the time of perestroika, a fresh breeze blew through the Baltic states. In August 1988 nationalist songs were sung in Tartu. A year later the Baltic nations expressed their unity in an impressive way, as on 23 August 1989 more than a million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians formed the Baltic Chain. It was 620 kilometres long and reached from Vilnius through Riga to Tallinn. Shortly after this event the Baltic states proclaimed their independence. (Deutsche Welle, 23.8)

The longest human chain ever united Tallinn and Vilnius in August 1989. It marked the peak moment of the Baltic states’ independence movement. It took a lot of planning, as the 620-kilometre course could not have a single empty spot. Everything worked out. Holding hands, people formed a chain through the three countries. This was a peaceful demonstration to achieve independence, a wake-up call to the Western world which had to reach Moscow. In record time the Baltic states managed to rebuild their countries. (Handelsblatt, 5.8)

Opening of the Baltic Chain Run 22.8.2009.
Opening of the Baltic Chain Run 22.8.2009.
© DelfiPressifoto

Seventy years since the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, 20 years since the Baltic Chain. These anniversaries remind us that we have to hold on fast to the idea of a common and free Europe. It is always easy to forget that this major move towards something better only took place in Europe in the last few decades. That is what the nearly two million people dreamed about, holding hands in the chain that ran through the three Baltic states. Now, 20 years later, we live in this future that people then dreamed of. Modern Europe is more stable, wealthier, more open and safer than it was for most of the 20th century. Everyday life in Europe may seem dull, but some time ago this would have seemed a utopia. We have to hold on to this achievement. (Kaleva, 22.8)

Just like the Berlin Wall, the Baltic Chain had a strong symbolic meaning; its influence reached further than the geographical kilometres it covered. The chain that ran through the three countries marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet era in the Soviet Union. In February 1989 Georgian demonstrators gathered on the streets of Tbilisi. Then, 20 people lost their lives at the hands of Soviet soldiers. Six months later, when two million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians peacefully defied the authorities by sending an unprecedented signal to the world via the Baltic Chain, the army did not try to use force to stop it. Of course, Moscow condemned the huge demonstration and over the next two years Latvian and Lithuanian citizens lost their lives in the demonstrations of power by the authorities. But by that time the irreversible steps had been taken and the Baltic states were on their way towards independence. In August 1989 the Baltic nations began to tear down the Iron Curtain; in November the Germans did the same. The Baltic Chain was like a huge arrow that struck the heart of the Berlin Wall. The importance of this historic event has also been acknowledged by UNESCO, which entered the Baltic Chain in its Memory of the World register. (Le Figaro, 24.8)

President wrote on the duplicate of the Berlin Wall: ''Elagu vaba Eesti!'' (Long live free Estonia!) 22.8.2009.
President wrote on the duplicate of the Berlin Wall: ''Elagu vaba Eesti!'' (Long live free Estonia!) 22.8.2009.
© DelfiPressifoto
ajaloo pildid